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My IntereBt In military etrates:lc plannln<3? and my
recent exposure to the Intricacies of the defense budget prooess
Induced this rather brief study of a fascinating, controversial
and most complex subject.
This paper contains examples of current thinkinf? of many
prominent civilians and military officers In regard to military
planning and the defense budget, plus some of my own Ideas,
Facts and ideas are set forth to indicate the Interplay of the
many forces and varied opinions in the military budget process.
As yet, no person, military or civilian, has been able
to devise a precise procedure for establishing major military
requirements and relating them to budget categories. Achieving
such an utopla would lack congrulty with our democratic processes
established by the Constitution of the United States,
The Ideas and suggestions set forth do not purport to be
solutions. They are intended to be thought provoking and
possible ways of providing additional facts to assist In the
decision-making process.
My purpose is to stimulate the thinking of military
officers who traditionally avoid, if possible, any Involvement
In the drab subject of budgeting—of Interest only to fiscal






The Btrateglc and tactical thinking and training of
unitary officers, traditionally Isolated from financial con-
siderations, must be oriented to the facts of sjodern warfare
Interposed on our process of government, economic conditions and
the federal budget.
Required
Conceptual procedures for developing sound inllltary
capabilities correlated with budgetary considerations to support
our national objectives.
AssuiBPtlons
A future general war will provide no period of prepara-
tion or ffioblllzatlon prior to coffimencement of hostilities.
The possibility of limited or local area wars will exist
for an Indefinite period of time.
Factors
A considerable portion of our strategic military plann-
ing, as pertains to financial considerations, is not feasible.
Too big of a gap exists between planning and actual figures.
More definitive military requirements are needed to develop
defense btKigets. It is also important to remember that the




For military planners, considerations of new powerful
weapons coupled with other aspects of technology transcends
their past experiences. In addition, available resources must
be divided among competing capabilities whose claims are never
going to be satisfied. Professional military Judgment must be
oriented to new strategic factors reconciled with the budget.
In the present era, defense decisions are not necessari-
ly based on military effectiveness, but for budgetary reasons,
(j^onflicting Statements Concerning Military Defense and the
Budg.et
The great divergence of opinions on this subject, quite
emphatically voiced by many responsible men, indicates a great
need for careful review and evaluation of this most complex
question ofs How much defense can we afford?
Dr, Bernard Brodle, formerly a professor in internation-
al relations at Yale University and a former member of the
faculty of the National War College, states in his book.
Strategy Ip The Missile Ai5;e t
The fsct that a general war will be fought and
swiftly decided with forces in being at the outset
indicates that most of the important strategic deci->
slons concerning that war must be made in the preceding
period of peace.
Because our security needs are essentially limitless
while our resources are definitely limited, the categories
of items which go to make up our national military estab-
llBhment inevitably compete intensely with one another
for funds. Moreover, this competition has to proceed
in the marked absence of any clear, generally accepted
guideposts for determining the apportionment of funds.
The ^war potential*' of the economy of either side

can have practically nothing to do with the outcome
of the war, because that outcome will be decided
before such potential 1b mobilized and absorbed Into
the military system.
The criterion of costs being "within reason"
Invokes a subjective judgment, but the requirement
to reduce the vulnerability of the retaliatory force
deserves such priority that If necessary certain other
kinds of military expenditure should be sacrificed to
It J secondly, there Is no question that this country
can afford, If It must, a much larger military budget
than It has been accustomed to at this writing.^
Mr, Hanson Baldwin, prominent military writer for the
New York Times, states:
The problems of defense today are Immense, some of
them perhaps Insoluble. The Administration, for Instance,
oust determine not only how much money should go Into
defense, but also what kind of defense It should buy.
No single mind, no military man or group of men can,
or should make these decisions. The coming problem of
how effectively the Navy's fleet of Polarle-flrlng
nuclear submarines complement, ae a sort of sea-going
Strategic Air Command, the big bombers of the Air Force
is one that must be decided by top-command civilian
judgment. The unwillingness to make such decisions
and to accept responsibility, after due advice from
the nation's top-ranking military advisers. Is one of
the weakneeees of our present security establishment.
^
Mr. George Fielding Fliot, well known nationally for
his newspaper and magazine contributions, has recently written:
Nor is it comforting to be lnforme'5 by the recently
retired Chief of Staff of the Army that **each year our
military prograins are projected forv/ard by one more
budgetary Increment, following the same direction
given by budgetary actions of years before. In the
language of the missile makers, the programs proceed
by inert ial guidance , with little or no command control
to reorient them to changed world conditions. Not
Bema2?d Brotlie, Strategcv In The Missile Me (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), PP. 360, 364, 402, 394,
p
Hanson W. Baldwin, !Rie G-reat Arms Race (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1958), p. 94.

only are these military programs ponderous and henoe
difficult to redirect, but there are powerful service
and economic forces committed to the maintenance of
their status quo. "^
Today we are being told with Increasing Insistence
that our nuclear-age problems cannot be Judged by the
criteria of the past. Everything is changed, everything
turned up side down by the new weapons ar^ the new time
limits; such is the cry, and »any have accepted it as
gospel. A whole generation of pseudo-scientific students
of war and military policy have seized upon the public
ear. .^ot long ago, one of the more vocal of these
prophets dismissed professional military opinion in
words whose naive arrogance is captivating. "The scale
of experience on which the expertise of most t^rofesslonals
has been fonaed has been almost completely overtaken by
the new technology. « • • It has been hard for men trained
in traditional patterns to adjust to this ur^heaval. ke a
result, much of the most fundamental thinking in the field
of strategy is now done by scholars who, unencombered with
an almost useless tradition, have sought to fill an in-
tellectual void.'* (cienry A. Kissinger, writing in the
New York Tiroes Book Review, 2? September 1959).^
^neral Taylor, Chief of Staff of the U, £. Army from
June 30, 1955 until his retirement In the soring of 1959,
contends that weaknesses in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system
have left the planning of our military strategy to civilian
amateurs and the budget-makers. In his recent book. The
Uncertain Trumpet . he stated J
Our military strategy today is a result of
admlnlBtrative and budgetary happenstanc© rather
than of an analytical appraisal of our military
requirements and of a ecientlflc budget formulation
directed at supporting these requirements with all
the resources available for national defense.
5
Another very pertinent consideration was most aptly
^George Fielding Fliot, "The Fatal Virus of a static
Strategy,*' U. ^. l^aval Institute Proceedings . February I960,
p* 26.
^Ibid . . p. 27.
^Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (Mew York:
Harper and. Brothers, Publishers, 1^60), p. 128.

stated by Lieutenant General Gavin, U. 5. Army:
Lobbies and rsressure f5roups will use every meane
conceivable to cause the Denartment of Defense to
Invest In their obsolete weapons systeras, ai*i they
will Insist on a continued inveetroent In those syeteme,
even thoui^h the best IntercBt of the country and the
eervlce concerned 1b not being served . They rationalize
their point of view In ternjB of possible unemployment
that may be caused by cancellation of orders.^
In our discussion of budgets, some mention of the high
coet of weapons and systems should be made to Indicate the
level of spend insr under consideration, Althoup;h the following
Btateinent from War and Peace In The Space Agre Is two years old.
It provides a erood example.
Speaking to a group of buslnessisen In Weshington
on March A, 1958, AsrlFtant Tecretary of Defense
W. J. McNeil saldt
These new weapons and eculpiEent, the products
of scientific and technological progress, are much
more powerful and have ir.uch greater coabat capability
than the items they are replacing but they also cost
a great deal more.
The average cost per aircraft . . . has tripled
over the last six or seven years* During; World War
II, for example, the cost of aircraft averaged about
flO a pound. For the very high performance aircraft
to be delivered two or three years from now, the cost
per pound will iDrobably run froir, |70 to |80. The
complexity of high performance combat aircraft may
be measured by their cost per pound compared with the
cost of silver which is less than |15 per pound.
The heavy bomber at the end of World War II was
the B-39 which cost about |600,000 each . , , the all
Jet B-55? Intercontinental bomber costs about "S million
each.
"
He went on to say that the inost advanced type of
aircraft now under experimentation, the X-15» would
probably cost in excess of "100 million per plane .
Comparable coet increase prevail in the missile field.
For exami?le an Atlas deployed will coet about tl7.5
million, Including a proportionate ©hare of the fixed
launching base ooBt. A short-range mobile j-nissile,
the Pershing, of about five hundred milee; range will
SjameB M. Qavln. War and feace In T^ie ST,aoe Age
(Kew York I Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p, 256.

ooBt one-half million dollare, iince it is generally
agreed that we cannot exceed inveetln^ a certain amount
of our proee national product in national defenae with-
out doing harm to the national economy, it becomes of
overriding importance that we make our technical deci-
Bionp well and that we make them quickly,
'
The question of how strategic decisions are made and
how the composition of supporting military forces are determined
conjures varying opinions from many nurportedly reliable
sources.
General Taylor has stated
:
• . • The secretary of Defense, through the use of
budgetary guidelines, has become the true artisan of
onr ciilitary strategy without necessarily foreseeing
the end nroduct. This setting of guidelines has not
been an arbitrary action on his part, but one to which
he has been impelled in carrying out the policies of
the '.xecutive branch of the governiBent, especially the
Bureau of the I^udccet. In the breakdown of the strategy-
making machinery, he has felt obligated to get on with
the business by establishing ground rules for budget
forjjiulatlon consistent with the expenditure targets of
the Treasury. These ground rules have had the effect
of shaping the military posture of the United States «
as it is today and as it will remain for years to come.
Mr. Walter Llppman auestions the qualifications of the
Secretary of Defense to make declRlone.
But then we arrive at the real question. How are
these great decisions to be made^ It is all very well
to say that they should be made by the Secretary of
Defense. But Secretaries come anc3 go. They are chosen
from lists of politically available men. They come from
banking, from law, from professional politics, from the
automobile business and the soap business. How does a
man who has spent the first fifty years of his life far
away from strategic problems go into the Pentagon, hang
up hie hat, sit down at the Secretary's desk, and make
the decisions which he Is supposed to make?^
'^
Ibld . . p. 237.
^Taylor, op. c it. . p. 122.
^'alter Llppman, j^ew York Herald Tribune . May 8, 1958.

The Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOF) hao been
described by T-pneral Taylor, U, r>. Army, ae more a preview of
the next biadget squabble and leee a document for mid-range
BtretefT.ic planning,
Che primary cause of failure has been the inability
of the Chiefs to agree on the best combination of forces
supportPble by the financial outlayp vrhich the Secretary
of Defense has considered feasible for planning. The
JSOP v/as originally conceived as a docurrent which would
allow the Chiefs to estimate lEilltary requirementB without
r»rlor consideration of budsret cellinfre. As a reoult,
JBOP 60 would have required about .,46 billion to implement
and the later ones ^55-<^58 billion. Such forecasts were
hijrhly unsatj.e factory to the Secretary of Defense, who
either rejected such estimates or lEPoged fiscal ceilings
to restrain what he considered Blue Kky planning. As a
result, the JSO? has become more and more a preview of the
next budget squabble and lesE and less a document for EDld-
rapRe strateprlc planning.
Considering the scope of the queetions which the
Joint Chiefs do consider, it Is interesting to note some
of the matters which they iBi«;ht be expected to consider
but do not. The first of these is the defense budget,
for which they have no agreed reeponeibllity. Although
chars?ed with preparing and sutmittlng to the Secretary
of Defense statements of military requirenients to be
used In connection with the nrenaration of the defense
biidget, the Chiefs as a corporate body take no part in
the budget's actual forraulation. However, Secretary
McElroy'^s action in referring the I960 budget to the
Chiefs suggests that the Secretary of Defense h^r- conje
to feel ICO re and more the need for the endorsement of
the Chiefs of his final budcrot. Fince these officers
In the past have had insufficient knowledge of the over-
all defense budget to warrant an expression of competent
opinion, renewed consideration aaay be exnected to giving
the Chiefs a more active role in bud eret-making. Without
it, there is no discernible way to align military require-
ffients, the military budget, and the service pnjgraajs
supported by the budget. ^^
An interesting example of how decisions are laade in the
Departicent of Defense with respect to a cut in funds Is given
by General Gavin:
^^Taylor, o??. clt. . pp. 91-9?.

8But more troublesoffle than these aeewlngly trivial
things wae the constant pressure on funding. The
technique vas to suggect that another out In funds,
aay 10 per cent across the hoard was due, i.'hen the
critical harra that v;ould. result from auoh a cut was
pointed out the reply was polite»
"Hie JoToartmont of Oc fence ur^^erstands ho\f serious
the Bltxiation is. i/e realize that you couldn't stand
a further out in either funds or personnel and still
EBeet your obligations. But suppose you ?t,o back and
think thf> thins? over. Suppose you die! have to take a
cut, juat Buppofflo, how would you do it?"
A week later, or tjerhatjs a few days, you would return
with an outline of the imolications of such a cut. After
exTilainlncr it you would be iK;reet0d with:
'That is very a;ood. I aoi f^lad to eee you think that
way. The program that you have recomnjended is aDproved."
Thus the burden of cutting is ahifted to the Chief
of Staff. If later there 1p occasion for a congressional
query, and there always is, Compress is assured that the
Chiefs of Staff recorngfjended or concurred, in the reduction.
To inform Congress to the contrary would be insubordination;
In fact the r/epartment of the AnEV has issued specifIc
instructions covering, this point. ^-^
Another very important and heretofore unmentioned group
of aaen, who have a great influence in budget deteriEinations,
are the members of the United States Congress. They want to
ffiake a good record, frora the 6tan.i point of ?^r>'^r'^'5riations and
expenditures, but cannot afford to asaks it at the expense of the
security of the country. And, ffierabers of Congress do not want
to be maneuvered into the ooeition of providing a lot of funds
in the name of national defense that are really not needed.
Sot being military experts, they rely heavily on and try to
adduce evidence froir the Department of Defense to assist them
in ffiakinp; top-level dec is ions.
A few pertinent sections from the I960 Department of
Defense Appropriation Hearings are contained in the following
paragraphs. These, it is hoped, will indicate the scope of
^^Gavin, op. cit . . p. 157.

9quest lonlng and the general thinking of some members of Congresa
on defenae mattere. The printed hearings of the SubcoDGmlttee
of the Committee on Appropriations of both the House of Repre-
aentatlTes and the United States Senate are a unique and
valuable source of information concerning overall defense
matters.
During the Department of Defense Appropriations, I960
Hearings before the subcommittee on appropriations, Senator
Symington made the following statement!
Two members of the Joint Chiefs have said in their
opinion we have too much strategic deterrent because
we have the capability to destroy the possible enemy
two or three tiroes. General Taylor said that If you
worked it out mathematically you would find we need
hundreds of strategic weapons instead of the thousands
we have. That was his testimony before the House Appro-
priations Committee, admiral Burke In testifying before
the same committee, said s "I think there Is a rate of
building up retaliatory capability which is greater than
that which is necessary. I think that the retaliatory
system should be examined very carefully with regard to
such factors as accuracy, targeting, relative invulner-
ability and reaction time. "12
General vmite, Chief of Staff, Headquarters USAF,
replied as follows:
I want to say that I categorically disagree with
both Admiral Burke and General Taylor on this subject.
I disagree not only with the philosophy which underlies
their statements but I disagree also, of course, as to
the quantitative forces that are involved. ^5
When testifying in regard to missile programs before
the fisuue subcommittee, Mr« V* J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) stated!
l^U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
HearioRB Before Subcommittee of Zema-te Committee on Appropria-
tions . Department of Defense Appropriatione for" i960 .
Q6th Gong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 285.
^^ Ibld .. p. 286.
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I can understand perfectly well why people In your
positions certainly must be confused when you hear
conflicting stories from witnesses from different services
on this missile buBlnees. I would hope before this commit-
tee completes its hearings on the procurement portion of
the money bill that the departments present, and that you
have the time to listen to, what I hope will be a clearer,
better picture than we have apparently presented so far.
I think you will probably find that there is a need for
both missiles.
As I mentioned to Senator Symington a minute apro it
is important that the scope of each program be pretty
clearly outlined and determined how they fit together,
before you consider the final action on the money bill
or perhaps even the authorization. I don't believe this
has been done; certainly it must not have been satisfactory
to this committee. ^^
Later in the same hearings, Senator Symington mad*
the following statement;
Senator Syminptton . I understand from the many talks the
President has made the degree that he believes the question
of money is important and the balancing of the budget is
important and the dangers of inflation are Important, I
agree they are important.
But then why are we supporting six Air Forces and
three Armies? The disagreement between the services
eeems to be at a new high today, and it is costing the
American taxpayer many billions annually.
So I would like to ask this: Have you any plans for
presenting a Pentagon reorganisation plan that would make
it possible to unify the services from the standpoint of
getting more defense strength for the tax dollar?
Secretary McFlroy . v/e have just been through a reorganiza-
tion of the Department of Defense. Ky own opinion is that
we had better let that one shake down before we propose
another reorganization of the Department .15
During the Department of Defense hearings before the
subcommittee of the committee on appropriations, House of
Representatives, the following statements were made by the
committee chairman, the Honorable George H. Mahon.
I have not had as much confidence as I should in
the Joint Chiefs as an organization. I am always afraid
^^ Ibid .. p. 397. ^^ Ibid .. p. 1429.
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every service is trying to get everything that it
can, and I am always v;orrled about the effectlvenesp
of the planning in the Joint ChlefB because of all
these elenaents.
Upon whom can we rely? There 1b no one to whom
the Congress can turn with coaplete assurance that we
can get the right story. We do not have our own Chief
of Staff and advisory group, so how are we to know?
Somehow or other the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in mj
opinion, have not been able to function very effectively,
though they are always good men,!^
Again referring to the controversial Issues in military
problesBS and the need for Increased responsibilities by the
Joint Chiefs of staff, Mr. Mahon said
:
They are not helping Congress and they are not
helping the Secretary of Defense, and the American
people are out on a limb Insofar as knowing what to
do and to think about these probleHie. The solution
to these problems does not come easily, of course,
and 1 have the feeling, which has been confirmed by
the testimony here this morning, that the Joint Chiefs
have not faced up to this eltuetion. They have not
kept their feet to the fire until they c&me to a
decision as to the standards of sufficiency which
should govern the size and coispositlon of our
defenses.^'
Because of the iinportance of the subject being dis-
cussed, my setting forth opinions and statements of top-level
civilians and lellltary officers was deemed to be a definite
requlreiaent to establish substantial background facts.
In this introductory chapter, several basic considera-
tions in the military planning/budget sphere of activity have
been stated. There is unanimity of opinion as to the importance
16
*^U* S. Congress, House, Subeommitte© of the Committee
on Appropriations, Hearinps:s. Departmept of Defer^se Appropria-
tions for 1960 . 86th Cong., 1st Sees., 1959, pp. 331-332.
^'
^Ibid . . p. 335,
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Of military strategic planning In the furtherance of our
national objectives. Also, the constantly Increasing importance
of the federal budget and Its effect on allltary strategy le
clearly recognized.
The greatest divergence of opinions ±3 in these
decision areas;
How much defense can we afford?
What kind of defense should we hav«?
How iBllitary strategic T)lannlng can be effectively
correlated with the budget by top-level civilians and military
officers.
What to do
ve need an expanded approach to military planning and
budgeting—not necessarily a reorganization of the Department
of Defense or the budget process, but oriented thinking and
application of new ideas and tools for solving complex problems.
An improved budget correlation with military requirements is
possible. If achieved, it will assist the military in evalua-
tions of what capabilities actually exist and assist civilian
officials In reviewing the defense buiget and in making defense
decisions*
All concerned should Increase their conceptual knowledge
and overcome the existing tendency to pass the ball and to
remain at the fringes waiting for others to initiate action and
to BAke decisions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are faced with making vital
decisions on the basis of an evaluation of a multiplicity of

13
conflicting factors replete with liBponderableEi and hidden
Impllcatlonp. ierhape thlB decision procese could be aided by
the developing technique of operations research"—the so-called
"eclentifio approach" employing advanced aiatheinatlcal techniques
and electronic computers. It is recognized that this method
does not, by any stretch of on©*6 imagination, purport to solve
the probleme, but it should provide valuable and helpful informa-
tion if purposefully employed.
The complexities of force requlrenientB and programs to
support the various military plane could be readily summarized
in any deeired combinations, inel\idingr sstlffiated copt figures.
Once the basic force level (s) are determined, the services would
be in a better position to develop the extent and cost of
supporting eleffiente.
The current trend of military services concentrating on
individual forces and the Department of Defense applying too
ffiuch effort on bMgetary matters and good management practices




BASIS FOR MILITARY PLAKNINa AND BUDGETINQ
Ihe President le responsible for over-all approval and
l»pl«centatlon of our National Security Policy. In the annual
budget of the United States Government, he preeente hie finan-
cial plan for meeting our national security objectives.
The National Security Council, The Secretary of Defense
ana the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the main advlpore to the
President in national security matters.
In budgeting functions, the Bureau of the Budget is the
executive branch of the President's staff which assists in the
formulation, review and managGBient of the federal budget.
MY^1§ ol* Defeynse Planp^PI^
Basic national Security Policy is developed in various
parts of the government, but principally by the State, Defense
and Treasury Departments. The ensuing broad policy paper
approved by the National Security Courjcll and the President
provides guidelines for more detailed planning by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The followinsr family of effier?:ency and/or war plane is
developed to provide for all foreseeable contingencies of
national defense.




is the plan for fighting a war this year. It roust be executed
with forces currently available and hence 1b a caDabllltlee
plan,
M1SCI3M&*— 'J^® Joint Strategic Objectlvee (JSOP) le
developed for a future war oonnnenclng four to five years from
now. ImDleraentlng forces for this plan are not firm, but are
based on mobilization base objectlvee, anticipated new weapons
and force levels ae determined to a large degree by available
ftxndlng. The plan establishes goals toward which the military
services should direct their efforts.
Lonog-range « ~-The Joint Long-Range Strategic Setlroate
(JLRBE) Is produced for the time Interval eight to twelve years
hance* Cf necessity, this dociament Ir based on forecasts and
the best possible estimates of the over-ell strategic situation
and new fighting capabilities produced by research and develop-
ment.
flow Kffeotlve Is Our MllJ.tar'y Flanninp^ ?
Lacking an effective ya3?d stick for measurement and
recognizing the problem of Intangibles in this area, the
following statements are presented for consideration.
Dr. Bernard Brodle, formerly a professor In internation-
al relations at Yale University and a former member of the
faculty of the National War College, now a Senior Staff Member
of the BAIW Corporation recently stated
:
There exists In America no tradition of intellectual
concern with that border area where military problems
and political ones meet. Although Ideally the military
apT>roach to strategic problems needs to be extended and
leavened by the relevant insights of the statesmen, such
insights are usually undevelotsed among those civilian
officials or politicians with whom the American military

actually bave to 46al. The civilian official In the
State Department will rarely know cDuch about current
military problems? and will therefore have no feeling
for their relevance to the Issues In hlB own Jurl8c3 lo-
tion. The uatlonal c;ecurlty Council Is for that and
other reaaons moatly a monument to an aspiration.
The aspiration le undeniably sound, but whether any
real enrichment of etrateglc thinking has proceeded
from It Is another question.-^
Mr. Hanson W, Baldwin asserts:
The Tiroblein of our security organisation Is not
80 much an intereervlce problem as It Is a civilian-
military problem. Most, though not all, of the
nation's military deficiencies today stem directly
frora civilian decisions. These Include the major
reductions in the military budgets between Vvorld
War II and. the Forean war, and the dominant "balanced-
biAiget" philosophy of the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Director of the Budget Bureau during President
Eisenhower's first term.
T-or several years after the Joint Chiefs were
established, they could get no clear-cut statement
of national objectives from the National Security
Council upon which to base strategic plans. Our
overconcentration on the nuclear massive retaliation**
strategy wag a product of National Security Council
debate, foreign policy requlroEdnts , and President
Eisenhower's decisions; it was not made in the Pentagon.
In 1957 and in 1956, the nation's intelligence agencies
repeatedly reported explicit evidence of nuicerous Soviet
ballistic ffiifisile launchln^s, but no action vms taken as
a result of these reports; in fact civilian, not military,
leaders cut budget requests that would have resulted in
speed inp our program. And, as a crowning irony, the
njuch-publlclzed Galther repoirt—a report of a private
group of citizens to the National Security Cour.cil
—
ireeoniffiended that the adKiniBtration spend the same
Increased budget on defense that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had urged futilely upon their civilian superiors
earlier in 1957.^
The functioning of the national 'security Council as
described by Mr. George Fielding Kllot ist
^Bernard Brodle, Stratep^y In The Missile Age (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959 J, p, 7.
%anson •'. Baldwin, The Great Arms 'iace (New York:
FredericlT A, Praeger, Fubllshere, 195B), p. 83.
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In the Kational Cecurlty Council, the requiremente
of foreign pel icy t fiscal pollcy» and military policy
must be reconciled. These requirements are, more often
than not, sharply in conflict. The vigor of their
reepectlve advocates reflects not only personal ability
In debate, but the skill with which each departmental
case hag been prepared in advance and steered through
the long prellrolnariee at lower echelons of coordination
before the final presentation, in which the t resident
must unavoidably be the umpire and bear the heavy burden
of ultimate decision. The men who take part in this
debate are of varying experience In government. They
are conditioned by these backgrounds, and the degree
of their experience in government determines the extent
to which they are dependent on their subordinates for
effective perfowuance •
3
Another aspect of the planning problem has been
described by Creneral Maxwell D. Taylor, U. 0. Army as:
\^lle the Department of Defense files periodic
progress reports with the Isiatlonal Security Council,
that body never gives a hard look at the actual condition
and capability of our military forces at any one time.
There is no consideration of the kind and amount of
military force we are capable of exerting and its rela-
tion to the world-wide obligations which we might have
to fulfill. Nowhei*e in the machinery of the government
X§ t^er^ fi prffff^^r? for pjie^K^pg ^Ull-^^ary ,cap^bU;}>tY
against political commitments or our forces in being
against the requirements growing out of the approved
"Basic National Security Policy.'"^
KuaerouB other statemente have been made concerning
the functioning of our country's national defense planning
organization, however, the basic ideas are presented in the
above quotations. Strategic planning difficulties stem from
lack of a defined and accepted national objective toward which
strategy can be oriented. After strategic plans are developed,
-^George Fielding Eliot, ''The Uncertain Trumpet,"
y. S« Hayal Institute Proceedings . May, 1958, p. 43,
Harper and
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York:






no check of nillltary capability agalnet political comroltroentB
or of military forces In being to support requirements of
effective plans Is icade.
As if these factors were not enough for military planners
to contend with, another related and moet important considera-
tion Is the constant pressure of budget restraints.
Dependence of Military Plans on Budfrets and Civilian Judp^roen'^
There can be little disagreement that strategy and
military planning are now, more than ever before, closely related
to the federal budget and the effect of civilian Judgment on
defense/budget decisions, both within and outside the Department
of Defense*
This statement can be substantiated by many prominent
persons, both in military and civilian professions. A few of
their views are contained in the following paragraphs.
Once again, Dr. Brodle:
Strategy In peacetime is expressed largely in
choices among weapons systems, which of course are
not bought ready-made off the shelf but developed
selectively by a procese which itself involves heavy
cost and many pitfalls. In making choices among
weapons eystems and related systems, like radar-
warning networks, the military budget is always the
major and omnipresent constraint. Thus in a book
on strategy we are inevitably concerned with (a) how
the size of the national defense budget is determined,
and (b) what sorts of considerations determine choices
within the limits set by the budget. Although in
former times It may have been legitimate to neglect
these questions in strategic discourse, In our era it
is clearly no longer so,
5
General Taylor came face to face with the budget problem
in the spring of 1956 while a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
^BiHSdie, op. cit .. p. 361,
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The Joint Chiefs were hardly back from Puerto Rico
before the mounting costs of the long-range missiles
and bomber programs exposed the conservatism of their
estimates of future financial requirements. The concern
over the snowballing of defense costs led to the next
major conflict revolving around the military strategy.
This clash occurred In the spring of 1956 In connection
with the drafting by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
•'Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" (JSOP 60) for Fiscal
Year I960, This Is the mldrange planning document which
undertakes to estimate force requirements four years In
advance.
From the summer of 1956 on, the primary concern of
the Department of Defense continued to be the mounting cost
of the missile and heavy weapons programs, If carried
forward as initially planned , would generate costs in
^
subsequent years far beyond the level of feasible budgets.
Mr. Hanson Baldwin provides a rather complete and
interesting insight regarding the civilians in the Department
of Defense—the contributions they make and their relationship
in the military planning/budget process.
But one of the main problems in the Pentagon is the
tremendous civilian layer of bureaucracy that has been
built up at the Department of Defense level and at
individual service level. There are a total of thirty
civilian secretaries, assistant secretaries, or their
equivalent In the Pentagon who can give directives to
the military chiefs of the services, even though most of
these civilians have no legal responsibility. The basic
law of sound organization—the coupling of authority with
responsibility—has been broken in the Pentagon. Vrtiat
makes it worse Is that virtually ell of the senior civil-
ians are political appointees, who know little about the
military and who stay at their posts for only a brief
time.
Many of the assistant secretaries, deputy assistant
secretaries, and senior civil servants who have entrenched
themselves in positions of power in the Department of
Defense try to formulate military policy in fields from
medicine to personnel to etrateg^y, and many of them actually
interfere at the lowest levels of administration and
operations in the service. The civilians have taken
over many of the functions of commend formerly vested
in the military officer, and they exercise this authority
without any co-equal responsibility for the results.
Taylor, on. clt . . pp. 38, 47.
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Atolral Burke keeps on a talDle in his Pentagon office
a long line of miniature TIbl^b, each the standard of one
of the powerful, but little-known civilians who stands
between him and the President of the United States, There
are eleven in the Defense Department and six in the Navy.
, . . Each of these principal civilians has deputies and
numerous assistants, most of whoir. have the power to negate
or delay, few of whom have the power to approve or expedite.
Nearly every proposed defense project impinges upon
several, or all of the special fields of the numerous
Aseietant Secretaries of Defense, so that all kinds of
cross-checking and "coordination ' are necessary. The
result sometimes, in the words of one authority, is like
"punching a feather pillow"; you can get no solid result.
There have been many instances of delays of many months
in action on requests for urgent research projects, some
of them involving only small sums. An official writes
about the Navyi "There are decisions being made as to
what missiles will go into certain programmed, newly
constructed men-of-war. And who is making the decision?
The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance or the Chief of Naval
Operations? ilot at all, the Controller. Kot on the basis
of military effectiveness, but for budgetary reasons."
The Department of Defense has grown into a tremendous
civilian-dominated bureaucracy. It has gone far, indeed,
from the original concept of a small policy-forming group
superimposed on the separate services. Its thousands of
employe© do not now confine themselves to policy; they
duplicate, and sometimes triplicate, the work done by the
Individual services, and they delve into administration,
operations and even command.
The defense budget is not, and never can be, the
product of the Joint Chiefs of ctaff or of men in uniform.
The size of the budget and, ultimately, the kind of strate-
gic policies it supports are, and must be, if a basic
American principle of civilian control of the military is
to prevail, the responsibility of civilians. This respon-
sibility lies with the ^resident and his Bureau of the
Budget, the Kational Security Council, the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress.'^
Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, recently retired from
the U. £• Army, believes that the time-honored principle of
civilian control of defense matters is sound and absolutely
fundamental in our democracy. In his recent book, he provides
7
Baldwin, op. cit. . pp» 91-92, 101-102.
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an Interesting explanation as to why the numbere of civilians
In the Departinent of Defense have Increaeed*
With the eetabllehcient of the Departasent of Defense
In 19A7, an additional layer of civilian management was
placed above the eervicee. Furthermore, by the law,
ERllitary officere are forbidden to be staff officers in
the Denartment of Defense. By its ruling they may be
aides or aesietants. They do not occupy executive or
decision Hjaking positions. In order to conduct the
affairs of his office, the :;'ecretary of Defense had to
bring in increasing numbers of civilian secretaries.
However, there is one layer of civilian participation
that is almost entirely overlooked and it is one of the
most significant in the Department, It is the group of
Civil Service career people who, year in, year out, work
in the Pentagon. Within the Arffied Forces themselves there
are many able Civil Service people who contribute effect-
ively. However, within the services the decisions and
final recoBiffiendatione are made by uniformed people to
their civilian Secretaries. In the Departaent of Defense,
there are over three hundred such individuals. They
probably have Bore lwr>B,ct on decision-making in the
Department of Defense than any other individual or
fcroup of individuals, military or civilian,"
In the above stateiRent, General Gavin succinctly des-
cribed the position of power of Civil Service people in the
Department of Defense and in the services. The distinction is
a worthy one. The Department of Defense lacks the desirable
combination of an operationally experienced military officer
reviewing the recommendations of civilians v^o lack practical
experience and conceivably will not have to "live" with their
decisions in actual operations.
Concerning the defense budget as finally received by a
service. General Gavin states that it is a directed one in every
sense. Her© is his explanation of the budget process in the
Department of Defense.
"James M. Gavin, War And Peace In The Space Aaie
(New York: Harper and Eirothers, Publishers, 1953), pp. 165-166.
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However, with the passa:re of the Nation :"/efenee
Act of 19^7, a new department was set up that Inter-
posed ltsf?lf between the separate branches of the
Armed Forces and members of Congress* Interposed
Itself, In that, ap a member of the Txecutlve Branch
of the government, It prepared the bud.f,et and directed
Its eupport by the Array, Navy and Air Force. It >/0uld
be moct difficult to ar^ue that the 'executive should not
prepare the budget for subjilesion to Congress, Neverthe-
less, when the defense requirements are considered end
the bvidp-et Is finally approved, the budget as finally
received by a service is a directed one In every sense.
Each service thr^n tailors its requirement b to fit the
ffloney to be provided. In the final analysis, the budget
datermines the strength and nature of the Armed Forces.
And in its final detenninatlon, after money is provided
by CongresB through the Bureau of the Budg:et and the
reapportlonnsent process, even specific itese of hardware
and projects are approved or rejected by the fiscal
officers of the Department of Defense through which
they ffiupt pasfi.9
By now, there should be little doubt in your ©Ind that
the inter-action of civilian decisions and budget considerations
does directly affect military planning. Financial considerations,.
previously deemed to be outside the purview of military planning,
now may largely deterailne future military strategy and our future
security. Military planners not only have the perplexing
problem of determining how and what i£ needed to Implement the
military portion of our national security objectives, but once
these decisions are made—then, to help decide the question of
can we afford it.
Military Budp^et Review
A detailed discussion of the budget review process is
beyond the scope of thip paper. However, a few cocRinents are
considered desirable to provide continuity.
Once the President has determined a budget planning
basis, the Secretary of Defense divides the total among the
Q
aavin, op. Pit ., p. 171.
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serylcee, Fach service receives approximately Ite previous
percentafs;e of the total as a starting^ point. The services are
the basic budgeting agencies of the Department of Defense.
The first real Job of budget review is at the level of y
the service secretary. Additional extensive reviews are con-
ducted by both the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the
Budget. Once the budg;et is approved by the Secretary of Defense,
it Is sent to the Bureau of the Budget and then to the President.
He decides finally what the budget is to be and submits it to
the Cons^rese. After extensive hearings in the Congress,
normally only minor adjustroents are made and the budget is
finally approved In the form of an ACT making appropriations
for the Department of Defense for the specified fiscal year.
The next step Is the apportionment process, the limitation by
the Executive branch of the rate of obligation of appropriated
funds.
The complexities of military financial planning and a
few of the peculiarities are set forth in the following para-
graphs ,
The budget problem, as depicted by Mr. Hanson W.
Baldwin is this;
The budiiet problem, however, Is larger than the
mere appropriation of funds. It involves the relationship
of legislative to executive authority, the constitutional
responsibility of Congress to raise and to maintain armed
forces, the role of tlie Bureau of the Budget and of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the apportionment of
appropriated funds.
The Secretary of Defense, under present law, has
tremendous nower within the Pentagon. He has the
authority to make decisions, to limit the funds requested
by the services from Congress, to approve or reverse
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Often
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In the past the Secretary hae failed to uBe his
authority; BOmetlmeB he has made vronfr decisions.
But he does not lack authority to make ieciElone,^^
Nearly all of the defense budf^ete of recent years,
particularly those of the last two years (the fiscal
years 1957-56), reDreeent in final form eharp reductions
of the amounts asked by the military. This par ins:
process took place in the Pentagon, at service level
and again at Department of Defense level, and in the
Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Council. •*•*•
And, in recent history, the wings of the Secretary
of Defense have been clipped, in a budgetary sense,
within the Executive Department by the growing authority
of the National Security Council and the Bureau of the
Budget. There is no Insurance that funds, once appro-
priated for specific projects or speed-ups, will be
quickly available, or even available at all. On
several occasions Presidents have withheld moneys
appropriated by Congress. And even when money is ma^e
available, the long and tortuous apportionment process—
the limitation by the Executive branch of government of
the rate of obligation of appropriated funds—often
causes endless delays and red tape.
In effect, this process is the rejustlfication by
each service, by each organization, and by each project
of the moneys already Justified to and provided by the
CongreBB, with the Bureau of the Budget and the Department
of Defense in the role of Judge and jury. This process
nay control expenditures and it may Insure more economy,
but it certainly has many built-in delays, and it too
often substitutes fiscal Judgment for technological
and professional Judgment. 12
The role of the Joint Chiefs of staff in the budget
process le described by General Taylor as:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body took no part
in the formulation of the I960 budget—nor had they
in previous years. This fact has often surprised the
Congress, which always expects the Chiefs of Staff to
give them competent advise on the budget* But thus
far, the Secretary of Defense has never given the Chiefs




as a body a clearly defined role In budget-making,
ThiB condition recultp in part from honest doubt as
to the extent to which the Chiefs should be drawn
into fiscal matters, In part froic a feeling that they
would ask for the moon. «e had shown the latter
tendency no later than June, 1958, when we forwarded
to Kr« McElroy an estimate of forces for 1962 bearing
a price tag of about :^48 billion. This figure was so
far removed from fiscal feasibility as viewed by the
Secretary that he disregarded the Chief's estimate in
preparing the budget guidance.
With the Chiefs out of the picture, the budget was
put together in the usual way, each service producing
its budget in isolation from the others. Although many
earnest diBcuseions of uni-service needs took place
between the Secretary of Defense, the Department Secre-
taries, and their Chiefs of Staff, at no time to my
knowledge were the three service budgets put side by
side and an appraisal made of the fighting capabilities
of the aggregate military forces supported by the budget.
This so-called "vertlcle (rather than "horizontal")
approach to building the budget has many defects and
accounts in a large measui»e for the inability thus far
to develop a budget which keeps fiscal eophaels in phase
with military priorities. It is not an exaggeration to
say that nobody knows what we are actually buying with
any specific budget, •'••^
During the hearings on the I960 Defense Department
Appropriation Bill conducted by the Defense Department Subcommit*
tee of the fenate Appropriations Committee, Secretary KcElroy
made the following statement concerning the adequacy of the
budget:
Mr. Chairman, I have described at some length
the defense program and budget proposed for the coming
fiscal year. It Is the product of the best advice and
judgment we could bring to bear on a problem for which
there are simply no exact answers. It does not Include
everything that evei^yone would like, but in the judgjnent
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the I960 budget "is adequate
to provide for the essential programs necessary for the
defense of the J^ation for the period under consideration,"
While each of the service Chiefs has some reservations
with respect to the funding of some segments of their
respective service programs, they find no serious gaps
in the key elements of the biJKlget in its present form.
^Taylor, pp. cit ,. p. 70.
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For ir.y xsart, I fully ap-re© vlth the Joint Chiefs
of 3taff and the Ireflldent that "this budget aeeuree
that essential defense needs are met, ^^
ia]__^
This chapter "briefly aummarlzee the Intricacies of the
BJllltary planning and budget process. If you have previously
found It a difficult subject to understand t at this point you
are probably more confused than ever—but many ^'experts*' feel
the sajne way. Very definitely, the process is a complicated
one.
The areas of discussion is a eo-called "grey" area, In
which clear-cut decisions are very difficult to make. The
requirements of foreign policy, fiscal policy and Biilitary
policy are often in conflict and necessitate soul searching"
decisions.
The akSequaoy of the current budget for military require*
ments is determined by the judgment of top civilian officials
In our srovernment. "This buds^et assures that essential needs
are met." Does anyone really Know what these essential needs"
are, both present and in the iminediate future, and if the
budget actually provides for them?
It appears that military officers can do a far better
Job in correlating: military planning and the budget. Such
correlation is essential to assist civilian officials In making
vital defense/budget decisions.
^mJ. S. Cons^ress, Senate, Coromlttee on Appropriations,
Hearlnpgg Before Hubcommlttee of Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions . Department of Defeiaee Approprlatlops' for I960 .
SSth ConjT. , 1st Sesfi. ,' p. 1^-
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There le no Job that we do well that we could not do
better, if we spent more time thinking how we might. We all
need to know more, think more, and underetand better the
thinklma behind the worde of the men with whoa we do bueiness,
A budget reviewer's judganent as to the reasonableneee
of requested funds can be no better than hie grasp of the
accompllshfljente to be attained—the end products and the actione





A general concopt 1b that military strategy oonsieta
of a plan composed of three elemente: objectives, power and
direction. Broad national objectives are translated Into
iiilitary objectives that are selected ae reasonable and attain-
able. Power coneiats of forcee in being including; numbers,
deployment, weapons eysteiij, state of readiness and available
logistical eupDort. Direction or operational control emanates
from a headquarters organized to make sound agelgtasent of
forces and to dii»ect these forces to the attainment of
objectives.
Military Planning—Before the Department of DefenseWWI I II U ll>l»i«»|i||l«».M.^>—rtWli-wIM— "III II 'I il»>UW—
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Reorganization
Prior to 1 January 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
functioned ae advisors to the Secretary of Defense who provided
direction to unified comraanders through three executive agents,
the service secretaries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed.
a family of emerprency/war plans such as the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP), described in Chapter II, and the
services prepared individual plans to support the olans




Obtaining unclaeslf led Information concerniraar the
real functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff le rather diffi-
cult, however, an Interesting account of Joint chlefa of
Staff planning was related to Representative Mlnshall In a
KouB© of Repreaentatlves Bubcommlttee hearing by General Taylor.
Mr. f< ,lnBhall . You (\o not actually dleeuse, then, whether
or not flsore B-52'8 are needed on behalf of the Air Force
or whether or not an additional aircraft c&rrler might
be needed, or the numbers of the ground troops in the
Army?
General Taylor * We do consider such matters In planning.
For example, the most Important annual planning paper
of the Joint Chiefs Is the joint stretep-.ic objectives
plan developed for a period 3 years ahead* The last one
we worked on Is JSOP-62, or the joint strategic objectives
plan for 1962. This plan states an agreed strategic concept
which (depicts In written fonc the kind of war or wars we
believe our Nation should be prepared to fight. It general-
ly breaks out the requirement s for general war» llffilted
war, and cold war in descriptive prose. The Joint Chiefs
are in accoi»d on that particular paper.
Following this we should also have appended to this
plan the so-called force tabs , which would in effect
state that in order to execute the agreed strategy
described in the plan, the Arniy ehould have so many
forces in terms of divisions and support, the Navy so
many shirks, and the Air Force so icany wings of various
types, iliat is where the carriers would be taken into
consideration as well as the r)-S2s, The Joint Chiefs
have never reached complete agreement on these force tabs,
however. We have come very close to agreelnp', on many
categories of forces, but in all the planning I have been
involved in, we have always split on Iraportant parts of
the force tabs. The re8^^1t is that the Secretary of
Defense is then placed in the unhappy position of having
his principal sililtary experts differ as to the kind and
quantity of forces necessary to support the strategic
concept to which they have all agreed*
In this situation, the Secretary does the beet he can.
He derives such benefit as may be available froiu the split
doovifent, «nd that presumably aids hini In developing the
budget guidelines which are stated to the service Depart-
ments in teriBs of ceilings on personnel, both active and
Pecerves, and in funds, Iheee guidelines then become the
fr^^ii^" ework within v?hlch a departmental budget is prepared.
Each service then comes forward with its requirements,
which ideally would provide the forces to support force
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tabs which In turn support the strategy. That Is the
theory,
Peoyga nt nation 9f the Department of Defence
kith the passage of the Department of defense Reorgan-
ization Act of 1958, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff has been strengthened to provide the military assistance
required for effective strategic plannlnc^ and operational con-
trol. The former committee system of the Joint Staff has been
replaced by seven directorates, including one for operations.
The new chain of coBJinand , running directly from the
President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs
of staff to unified and specified coffimanders has been estab-
lished, l^e functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of
military departments have been revised to inflect this new chain
of command for the operational direction of the Armed Forces.
All of the unified and specified commands were transferred to
the new command structure by January 1, 1959 and concurrently
the military departments were relieved of the responsibilities
they previously held as executive agencies for these commands.
The number of officers In the Joint Staff was doubled
to provide the Secretary of Defense with the military staff
support that he would need in exercising the operational control
over the new unified and specified command structure.
This strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
facilitate better planning and provide coordinated, operational
U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on AT)prOT)riatlons , Hearing:s. Oepartisent of Defense Appropriations
for 1960 . 36th Cong., 1st Sees., 1959, pp. 433*4pu
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control of the Army, "avy and Air Forces, Only experience will
tell whether the re organ l?*^t lore will correct reported weak-
neseee In deteraBlnlnar etandarde of force sufficiency and
related budgetary mattere.
civil lan-inllltary relationships in military planning
and budget ins; are essential and widely accepted in our form of
govemiEent, But the unresolved problem area is to determine
jjho ie reepon Bible for vfhat decisions.
Our military planners should utilize every available
source of assistance froia the scientific and business worlds,
ineludinp; operations research and electronic data processing,
in developing and analyzing national defense plans and in deter*
lElning supporting force requirements attainable within a reason-
able defense budget. ^< r>offitive etateiuent of operational force
requirements could conceivably strengthen ovir military capabi-
lities and would greatly assist civilian officials in making
decisions in both defense and budget matters.
This concept envisions a -Joint Chiefs of Staff deterfflina-
tion of ffiajor forces needed for various levels of military
capabilities and functions. Txperienced aiilltary officers should
have the beet professional knowledge to determine standards of
sufficiency governins the size and eoifipopition of forces needed
to carry out military plans. Next, any form of military power
has to be translated into exrsonRtve *'hard! ware'' and thoroughly
trained manpovrer before it can be effectively used. Correlation
of steted force requirerrien te with their cost v;ould relate theie
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directly to the defense budget. Both civilian officials and
military officers would be able to more re»;'iily comprehend the
direct effect of the budget ani Its influence on our present
ani future military forces.
The net effect of our existing procedures of not clearly
statin?? major force requirements ie that too tnany people make
declBlonw, not based on facts, but aierely on what they think is
boBt, Unfortunately the emphaais is strongly biased toward
reducing the defense budget. Kiilltary officers must fight a
unified offensive to reetore the "operational flavor" to
Bllitary budgeting and to reverse the ever inoreaeing emphasis
on z^o^ management and increased fiscal accounting* We now
have tight financial control, but hazy ideas as to how opera-
tions are affected.
Dec ie Ions affecting our i»llitary capabilities niuet not
paee by default to budgetere because of a Isc^rt of agreement and
IndeclBivenese concerning force levelf: by our top military
officers.
All defense budgets Include decieione based on certain
calculated risks. Only by rrieane of a thorough and careful
analyeis of all available and pertinent facte can the level of
risk be reduced to the absolute rlnimunj, -llltary planners
developing force requirement© irmet have specif ic goals in mind.
'She determination of major forces Deeded for national security
and their level of readlneee at any particular time ie a





The inft.lorlty of military fDnctlone, puoh as atowlc
retaliation, ©Ir de^en^e, limited verfare, Ftrateslc airlift
an<9 seal 1ft require the contributions of two or oiore servicee.
Even antlpubmarine warfare (ASW), previously a eole Navy
responsibility, now may require close coordination with the
Continental Air Defenee iommand (GONAD) In defending continent-
al United Statea 8(a;alnst potential enemy launched submarine
niflelleB.
In the peet, forces for these functions were determined
toy the in^ivl'5ual services accord ins; to their general mission
and the pnd result normally review in a vertical fashion at the
Department of Defense level. What is nee?ei 1b a careful
horizontal review and scrutiny by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
determine whether each function le properly supported by the
appropriate forces of all contributing eervleee.
The questione of proper balance and sufficiency are
ever preeent in the area of major force requirements and weapon
eystetnp. Obeolete eysteius Esuet be eliminated, Coffipetlng types
icust be evaluated and isarfflnal types dropped. Ve can only
afford to concentrate our efforts on the snost effective and
promlPin^ weanon Rvptepp to Increase our military oaT>abllitie8.
The baeic aeclelona and recommendations in these and function
areae muf^t be i»?8ae by the Joint Chlefp of ?taff.
Atomic retaliatory forces . ^-^Bae ieally doee the United
Stfttep have sufficient (leterrent r>ower to make it Bupresiely
uninviting for our noteotial enemy to launch a nuclear war?
What is the best ''mix" of deterrent power made up of long-range
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boipbprc?, lnterwp<^ late ren^p irlerllc^e ar<? ICPMut
Strategic etrlklnf forces hsve brer plven hlrh rsrlorlty
by the /olnt Chlcfr of '^taff and bucig;et alloc? t ions, h<»inc© ar«
Boug-ht by each of the Rervlcce. Fach of the veapon systeniB Is
very expensive. The Bituatlon is further coispllcated by th©
fact that there forces could be ueed In and be launched froro
Biany rarte of the v;orld snd in cany theaters, '^he Joint Chiefs
of staff fflUBt control and thoroughly evaliiate the etrstefflc
Etrlkln<r force carabilltleF of the Air Force and the Navy. This
function Is Increaelng in Importance because of the Introduction
of new HilEBllee and the very high copt of these new weanon
eyeternB, I'he overall carjablllties of the lCB??e, IHBMa Including
the POLA^-IS auBt be carefully evaluated and planned employment
closely coordinated.
Instead of each service determlnlnsr forcee to carry out
ite ffiiseions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make firm
recoiTEendatione to the £?ecretary of Defense. Their conaldera-
tione ehould include:
!• How tBany weapons do we need to deetroy eneicy terg^eta?
2. \\1iat second strike capability is needed?
3. '^?hat coffblnation of forcee coinpr5eej? the beet "mix**
of ptratrpric forcee?
A. The vulnerability of veapon/irilsEile launchln«r
oyEteaac.
5. The t JiTie-phafiin?? of available and future weapons/
6. The overfall copt of the various wea-Don eystemB'*-
not Bierely the weapon itself.
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These considerations will require "bouI Rearohing" and hard
decisions, but someone has to make them, rhe Joint Chiefs of
Staff should be In the best position to decide vrhat is needed
and when.
Continental Aiy Defense . -*A moet expensive and rapidly
changing category of forces. The North American Air Defense
COBiBand (IfOHAD) includes the Continental Air Defense Command
(GONAD) and is coroposed of forces of the Air Force, the Armyt
the Navy and Canada, It is doubtful whether the total cost of
even operating OONAD has ever been eomplled. Like other weapon
systeiBS, rapid changes in technology may render many NORAD
installations and weapon systems obsolete by the time they are
fully eetablished or shortly thereafter. For exafflple, the Air
Early Warning System ae originally planned included the DEW
Line, seawall extension by naval forces, piloted intercepter
aircraft, SAQE System (deelshed in 195^) » NIKE inetallatione
and 80 forth, l!^ow, as rapidly as possible, this system is
being replaced by the BalliBttc Missile Early Warning System
(BHEWS) including antl-niiseile rolssiles. The next developasent
will be space satellites.
Obsolete systeiBB and forces must be ©liminated ae
rapidly as possible. For example, is the military value of the
Nftvml Air Early Warning £iquadron*e continuous coverage In the
seaward extensions of the Air Early Warning Lines both in the
Atlantic and the Pacific worth the cost of operating it? This
operation is expensive and requires considerable numbers of
trained personnel that could conceivably be more profitably

36
employed in other areas such as ASW—both men and dollars. This
decision and others concerning air defense should be made by
the Joint Chlefe after a careful review of facts submitted by
the Commander I'iorth American Air Defense Command.
AntlBubroarln^ Warfare (fSV>) .*"The basic function includes
roultl-purpoee force employments which should be clearly differ-
entiated in terms of requirements; i.e., defense of continental
United States against missile launching submarines; protection
of naval striking forces, mobile logistic support force and
ocean convoy from the submarine threat. Antisubmarine warfare
eonetitutes a real challenge and eetlffiated forces far exceed
those which can be made available. Hence, decisions must be
made regarding the degree of emphasis on various ASW missions
based on the concept of a future general war. If we losically
give the Soviets the capability to develop a weapon system
equivalent to or superior to our POLARIS weapon, then anti-
submarine defense of continental United States deserves high
priority. Adequate forces, detection systems and command-
control centers must be provided similar to our GONAD system.
Currently the trend is to consider ASW in general overall terms,
with little emphasis as to the assignment and capabilities of
ASW forces for specific miseione.
Limited Warfare . --Plans for limited or local war
situations are probably the most difficult to formulate.
Contingency plans for anticipated limited war situations should
be developed with basic forces to support the various plans
indicated. These forces will provide the estimated requirements
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fte to the amount of support required by the Combined Commanders
in the Atlantic and Pacific and the capabilities of the cervices
to provide needed forces. It le realized that all deeired
forces cannot be provided at the earae time for all contingencies.
But, a review of these plans for specific areas will asslBt in
determining how many forces can be furnlehed without weakening
our strategic Btriking forces and continental United States
ASV/ defense forces.
Additional considerations for the Joint Chiefs in
reviewing this function include determining whether we have an
adequate supply of conventional weapons and the proper aircraft
to deliver them. Or will coiaffianders be faced with using a
|4-5 million dollar aircraft to deliver a 500 potiM boffib or to
make rocket runs In close air support of our ground troops.
Another feasibility study entails the cost of airlifting
squadrons of the Tactical Air Coffiiuand to a lliBlted war area and
providing support facilities overseas versus the cost of provid-
ing elBjllar air support by navy carrlei»s. A reallstio study
of these cost figures should be made In various geographic areas
Of the world that ere potential trouble areas.
Airlift and geallft Reouirements .—Of all services, both
for limited, war situations and on O-day of a general war, should
be carefully estimated and consolidated. These figures should
then be coispared with transport forces available. It is very
doubtful that anyone knows what the estimated total requirements
are and what lift capabilities exist. Matching requirements with
capabilities and time-phasing Is Baost important. Once th©
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figures are ooaiplled, a decision muBt be made as to which
services have priority on available sea/air transportation, or
whether additional forces should be procured. Asaln this
involves coste.
Kobilizatlon and Heaerve yollcies ^-^Thle area ie
undoubtedly a fruitful area for many 'hard decisionB that can
eave coney, but would b© politically unpopular. If the concept
of a short war ie accepted, then the military value of mobiliza-
tion potential and reserve forcee decreaees rapidly. This change
may be even more drasatic aa *re enter the advancing; Hiisslle-
epace era. The potential of reserve personnel in many areas,
especially aviation, ie questionable* Hie cost of training
and providing modern scarce equipHient for them must be weighed
agalnet the potential value of and need for these forces. Once
again, the ne^ for poeltive recoisffiendatione by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
What oonstitutee realistic Bsilitary mobilization
requireiEentslr Jihould we state reQuiremente for a llKlted war
Bltuation and plan to initially fight a general war with forcee
in belng^
Mobilization reeouroee and reserve forcee expend
valuable dollars. Kow much can we afford? Heedless to say,
any changes in reserve policies will Invoke considerable
political Interest aijl possible oppoeition.
Support Forceg ai^ Facilities.— The level of supnort
forces and faoilitiea is directly related to the operational
force level. 1?hi8 determination can be made by the individual
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scrvioee once the compos it ion and mission of their respective
operational forces ie determined by the Joint OhicfB of Staff.
A sumiaary of the service support forcec and facilities,
together with their cOBt, would be forwarded to the Joint
Chiefs for a careful review as to adequacy to meet minimum
requirements.
The passage of the Department of Defenne Reorganization
Act of 1953 strengthened the organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff by providing for more effective strategic planning
and centralized operational control of all forces. The advan-
tages of centralized planning include: a determination of
over-all objectives, unanimous decisions as to force levels and
weapon systems, aesignisent of forces and iriBSions to the ser-
vices, and provision for oentrallzcid control with decentralized
execution. This control concept is most important in a general
war situation, as no one center can control world wide opera-
tions. Further there ie the almost certain probability that
considerable communications would be knocked out. With an
effective centralized plan, operations of all forces could be
coordinated and outlined in advance together %;lth aself^nment
of missions and forces to specific areas. If and when unexpected
hostilities F-hould commence, our military forces would be ready
to carry out their tasks without further direction from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
If the Joint Chiefs determine over-all force require-
ments and correlate force levels/functions with their estimated
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cost, needed background information v/ill be available for
civilian officialG reviewing and Biaklng deciKione affecting
the aefenB€ budget.
Effective planning by the Joint Chief© of Staff includee
developing a family of war plane which state requlreffiente and
contain force tabs for a general war and limited war situations.
The determination of forces ehouia be by uneniwous agreement
as to what forces are to be provided by each service. Addition-
al forco considerations to include a tiine-phaeed procrram for
modernization or replaocment of major unite ap required, -very
attempt should be mode to eliininete obsolete 'hardware" and
marginEl tasks for services forces as rapidly as possible. The
Joint Jhiefs are in a position to determine what forces are to
be provided and to then take a horizontal look at the units the
services are actually providing.
A careful study should be made and an attempt made to
summarize force requireiaents by sajor functions. The details
to include a break-down by services, weapon systems costs,
and the needs for various levels of readiness and/or capabili-
ties in the functional areas. Once forces have been approximate-
ly determined and a meaningful price tag" placed on them, we
will have a much better unlerstanding of our military programs
and the relative costs. Budget personnel will have improved
guidelines to use in the preparation and review of the defense
budget and a far better understanding of where the money is to
be spent and why. For example, various categories of military
capabilities in specific functions and at various levels of
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oapabllltlQo will cost this amount. If the amount la reduced
frorr the defense budget, here is how It will effect our military
force operational capabllitlee. This ie one of the budget
details that can not be determinoa during a review of our present
budget. .4ore Important, it Is difficult to determine and little
effort lE made to find out what defense we are actually getting




vmat Is It t
Military Operations Peecarch is the spplicatlor] of
scientific fficthod to the ctuay of operational problcnje in order
to give Eilitary cOHiffiaMere a Quantitative bapie for declelon.
It coDBietB of oheerving ana claBBifying lata, develoT^ing
theories that fit the obccn^ations an-S uEing theic to predict
the effects of changes in conditions or proceSurec, Ite
functione ere to define the d.cciBion area, narrow the ecope
end to tett it in tern^t of expected reeultB,^
i^Tiy CperationEi Feeearch ic needed
Mtjch ae people like a precise, **one»tvo-three" or a
*'two plue two equals four" solution to difficult probleics, our
problesj area ie a complex one with multiple issuer which are
not readily eirplifiec^. . Military planning—force requireiEents~-
the defenae budget can not be considered Independently as they
are closely interrelated and must be treated ar, a whole. The
EUjcmery of Chapter III stated a desirable, but rather Utopian
concept which is not fully attainable in the nsllitary planning
and bwiget proceed. As yet, no person or system has been able
^Conrad Abhau, "Operations Research, Aid To Military





to neatly resolve the many faoetB of the military defensa
bud/?et
.
The reaulrements approach, which atteraiits to determine
force levels by functions, eeoure© ai^wlnistratlve simplicity
only at th« ooet of treating interrelated nroblejss aa if they
were indeoendent. It la a convenient approach that ^lisnoeeB of
analytic difficulties, with few exceptions, military critloe
tend to follow this earae approach and generally acuree with this
condensed and overaimplif led sequence of fflilltary nlanninp;.
First, based on national ob.lectivee, aetermlne what kind of
fflilltary caDabllitle© are needed. Second, determine how these
capabilities are to be achieved. Third, aptfralse probable
enemy canabllltles, determine how mioh must be provided. And
In recent years, a fourth stae^e, budc^et considerations deemed
to be outside the purview of the military, ^ud^iet oonatralnte
are imposed, constraints that are accepted uncritically when the
threat of "national bankruistcy" is invoked. As a consequence,
reaulrements are cut—the results of the third planning stage
alone undergo revisions—»and revised actual luilltary canabilltles
eusersre at the end of the Planning cycle.
In overs IistjI ifyln^ the issues and following the classic
military approach, most critics refrain froEi discussing other
ln»T)ortant factor® which should be Included in defense budctet
dissertations. For exara-ole, the basic conceT>t of flailitary
deteriBinations stated in the United States Constitution which
Malcolm w, Hoag, Boise Cogplex;ities In Mi:?._^tarY
Plani-^ln.c-. , Pand Corooratlon Paper No. P-1531 (Santa Iconic a,
Calif.: and Corporation, 1958), vp* 3, 4»
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provl(5efl for civilian control over the si?© ana scope of our
military forces by the PrepldeTit and the Congress. Oth«r buds^et
Influencee ar? GongresBlonal actions, affectecl by political
innuendoes an^ numerous nreoeure ^rouT)a, These and other factors
constitute the "facts of life" In our 5emooratlc process. In
many instances relating to bvitif^et issues, the rullitary depart-
»entB are innocent "whippln« boys'—cast in the role as the
Instisf.ators of all of the problems.
If all military "neeclf' could be fully roet, the requlre-
iBonts approach might be the answer and our probleii! would be
practically solved. However, there Is little doubt that this
will never happen, especially in peacatlTr.e.
Annlicatlon
In the iDllitary plannlnf^/operations/budget area,
oneratlons research has inany important applications. For many
yeara war-f:^aTKins has been recognized as the moet realistic way
of testlnar the effect IvenesR of war nlanp, strate/iies, forces,
weaDons, and so forth. The present use of high-speed electronic
ooiaputera in scientific war-ffanilng techniques, permits the
utilisation of a treiaen.1ous amount of data. Hence, when one
considers the iaagnlt\id.e of facte that *-'-^'' Joint Chiefs of Staff
nmst evaluate anl welisrh in reaching decisions, the advantar^ea
of an electronic fact finder and fact analyst is readily
apparent.
The application of this technique to the ©valuation of
vital problems such as force structure, weanon system evaluation
and the analysis of war plans should provide a solid intelllflfent

bade for ircportant icciclonfi. Additional facte cam be srener-
ate'! that will contribute to aetBll©!? cost-pffertiveneep pturlies
of vcrloiir force Ptnicturcp an<;. weapon systemc for use In
burlg-etary cor^plderatlone.
CperatlotiE Tee earch ^^cthodg
The ffiethode fnay be diviaed Into analytic, areiclng and
Blmulatlon techniques. AIbo, treaiendoiiE aKountB of data can be
etored, f^ortetl and qulcKly stiminarlEed according to needs. The
analytic approach Involver the developr-ent of a tnatherratlcal
problesi, represontetlve of the real situation, that can b© solv-
ed either exactly or approyicately. The procesaee are those
of aifforentlal equations, probability, Btatietlcp and the
theory of ^7^B,nQB, Both educational and analytical war gaming
prooedurec have been used by the aervlcea for a great s^any
yearr. Cnponlng coiroanderfl are confronted with an environnent
ill which they exercise profeseional ,^udsment in reaching command
declelons. They fight the var In a moet realietlc manner and
detailed histories of exactly what happened to all aircraft,
ahlpB, mioGiler, basee, targets and war-Bupportlng reeourcee
ar® prepared for analysis.
Old Id 0ft--* F:xr)g^nd.ed Use
Operations Hesearoh i-^ not a new idea In the jnllitary
services. Both the Air Force and the IIwtj have used Binllar
study groups and techniques for research and development since
about 19^^. One of the llavy projsrajrf; at the i^assachueetts
Institute of Technology d enveloped into the Navy's O-oeratlons
TiNraluatlon Group, the Operatlone Analysis Office of the Air
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Force grew out of various units established in the fall of 1942,
By 1948 the Air F'orc© had created the Rand Corporation, a non-
profit institution specializing in probleine of research and
development. The Air Battle Division of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plane and Programs, U. 3. Air force, utilizes electron-
ic eoicputer war garoing teohniqueE. The Array has its Operations
Research Office and the Weapons Syetejn Evaluation Group is
located in the Department of Defense.
Undoubtedly these Operations Research groups do provide
valuable information used in njllitary planning. At this writing
It is not known whether any stMy has been made to detenclne
the degree of coordination of the various prograins or the re-
sults of the programs at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. If a
consolidated program is in effect, perhaps it can be improved
as the variables of the problem are constantly changing and new
ideas are needed. With proper guidance as t© desired programffi-
Ing, the studies and reports of these various research groups
could bring all phases of the subject problem into focus for
the Joint Chiefs of Btaff. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
could refer any of its special probleais or needs for sumiaarlzed
factual information to one or more of these groups for study or
tabulation. With oonputers, simulated changes can be introduced
and resixlts estimated. This Infonsat ion/analysis system would
provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a look at the consolidated
problea and provide a means of measuring progress toward goals
and objectives.

Problems to he Studle<;!
This "brief paper can only treat with a few sugpeetea
problems or basic Ideas applicable to Operations Reeearch, The
ooffiplex iseuee of the Kiilitary planning/budget proceseee provide
infinite possibilities. A few examples are submitted as
feasible studies for Operations Research Groups in providing
aflsietance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their deliberations.
Possibly the Issue at the heart of the probleas is rea-
sonable resource allocation. From these three words a multitude
of discussions, bordering on arguaents, emanate. Achieving
reasonable agreement by the majority of parties Involved Is
similar to collecting the contents of an over turned "can of
worms. Returning to the problem, one test of a sensible allo-
cation is whether the gain from employing an additional resource
unit in one use outweighs the loss occasioned by diverting it
from an alternative use.* Or stating it another way, what is
the best combination of bonsbers and lalsslles to achieve certain
Billtary objectives.
In a determination of retaliatory capabilities, objec-
tives can be stated in terms of a stipulated degree of confidence
in the ability to destroy a specific list of enemy targets. This
defines a rather precise objective against which fulfllliBent by
alternative means can be evaluated and various coiRbinatione of
forces determined. The cost of one system can be compared with
another in terms of which offers the lowest cost for accomplish-
Ing the objectives.
^Hoag, op. cit .. p. 9. I^M* » P» 1^'

48
This Information should aeslet military planners In
determining various levels and types of strategic retaliatory
capabilities, including expenditure© required. Another related
task is to fit it into the overall defense budget figure with
other competing military capabilities. Force allocations are
variable to a degree depending upon the size of the budget. The
suffiinarlzed results of these studies would conceivably provide
some of the best available information for top level officials
faced with making tough decisions
•
Similar analysis studies, by means of appropriate
programs developed by Military Operations Research, can be made
for the majority of military functions (continental air defense,
antisubmarine warfare, etc.) discussed in the Force Reoulrement
Considerations paragraph of Chapter III, page 33.
In regard to new programs, such as iffiprovemente in the
air defense system, an analysis could be made to determine
ilitary returns from increments of installation and upon com-
pletion» The prospective installation and operating costs could
be determined. Usually they all end up far higher than original-
ly planned—either by clever intent or because of uncontrollable
causes.
It is a mistake for Operations Research to examine only
important expensive systems and to overlook additional elements
whose role an:3 costs are relatively small. The collective
effect of many small items can have considerable influence on
both the military capabilities and/or the budget problem.
To achieve effective military capabilities, it is
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eBsentlal to explore widely different allocatlone of capablll-
tlec to Be© how alternatlvee fare. There le no one solution,
likewise the enemy threat le not flx€>d. The problem Is one of
balance between conflicting conslderatlone. Balance cannot be
tested for merely one budget level, but should be teeted at
many sharply different levels. Ilie resulting "facte" could
provide a useful corrective to siany defense dlsouBslons. Mili-
tary alternatlvee must be ooBTtpared In ways that are neither eim-
ple nor obvious.
Smuigary
Functions of Military Operations Research are to define
the decieion area, to narrow the scope and to test it In terms
of expected results • Objectives are to clarify the relation
between numerous alternatives, to determine their effects and
to indicate those which measure un beet. Operations Research
is hardly a cureall for every defense deeieion ill, nor a source
of automatic declBlons. It Is liiBlted to a study of tangible
and Bseasurable factors.
To date, no person or system has been able to neatly
resolve the many facets of the military defense budget. But,
decisions have to be made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must
evaluate war plane and related vital problems of force structure
and weapon syBteins. Detailed coBt-effectlvenese etiidies of
military operations are needed for use in budgetary considera-
tions. It is an accepted fact that sufficient resources or
dollars are not forthcoming to satisfy all military needs,
especially In peacetime. E'ven If substantial defense budget
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Increaeee could be Justified, they would be difficult to
Implement in our country today. The budget i& tied to an
economic base and as a result it can't be jiggled too a^uch.
The accepted military approach to planning and budgeting
Is familiar—convenient—and hae been eucceesful in the past.
But it is now largely outmoded in view of the large volume of
complex data that must be collected or eBtimated and evaluated
in order to reach decisions. New sophisticated concepts and
Methods made possible by Operations Research offer far greater
potentials than the old system, largely limited to pouring
over military writings.
This suggestion is not intended to be a get on the
"band wagon ' approach, with an electronic coiEputer, so common
In both business and government circles during the past few
years. Computers are not miracle machines or thinking**
nachinee. They are a device for smssaging data with tremendous
speed as a major virtue. It is true that large amounts of
information can be compiled by manual means, but how accessible
is it and how long does it take. There is little doubt that an
advanced data processing system can effectively filter out
essential information and present it in a more timely fashion
and in a more useful form.
The ides of operations research in the military services
Is not new. But, existing programs should be coordinated and
employed so that individual and combined service capabilities
and related costs are brought into sharper focus at the Joint
Chiefs of Staff level. The merits of systematic analysis and of
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an electronic fact finder to asBlst In the decision making
process should be worthy of serious consideration and practical
application.
In my opinion, Dr. Brodle has oucclntly Eumraarlzed
military operations research as follows:
The universe of flata out of which reasonable
military decisions have to be made Is a vast, chaotic
nsaes of technological, economic, and political facts
and predictions. To bring order out of the chaos
demands the use of scientific method in 8y©tei(iatically
exploring and comparing alternative courses of action.
When the method is true to its own scientific tenets,
It Is bound to be more reliable by far than the tradi-
tional alternative method, which is to scOlcit a con-
sensus of essentially Intuitive judgments among ex-
perience;^ coEiaanrJers. The new method does not throw
out the best of the old , for it attempts to incorporate
in an orderly fashion whatever is good in strong intui-
tion, and the military commandfirs still consider and
accept or reject its findings.-'
There is no ppe easy or practical solution to the
military planning ana budget proble®. This field presents a
challenge and opportunity for all persons interested in providing
optlmuic security for our country, compatible with other major
interests.
t5
•^Bernard Brodie, StrateffY In The Missile Age
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 407.

CHAPTER V
Initially In this paper, BOise opinlonc of top-level
civilians and allitary officere were quoted to eBtablieh a
eound basis for this discueeion. Most of the basic coneidera-
tlons, the complexitiee and the inter relationship of the
ffiilitary etrategic planning and the budget process were eet
forth.
The comicents and crlticlEms quoted, quite well eetablish
the paran:etere of the probleiE area. As you have read, the
Boope iB broad and eoieplex. Certain pertinent cosinients are
reiterated for emphasis.
Mr* Baldwin stated that top-comiEand civilians are
unwilling to leake decisions and to accept responsibility, after
due advice froin the nation's top-ranking military advisers.
Kr. Kissinger apparently believes that most of the
fundamental thinking in the field of strategy is now done by
scholars who, unencumbered with an almost useless tradition,
have sought to fill an intellectual void.
General Taylor contends that weaknesses in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff systeos have left the planning of our militapy
Btrategjr to civilian amateurs and the budget-makers. He also
stated that the Secretary of Defense throujjh the use of
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budgetary puidellnee has become the true artisan of our
military ntrategy without necescarlly forepeelnp- th^ end
product.
Mr, Llpprcan quentloned the cuallfIcatlons of the
Secretary of Defense to make dec Is lone • How doee a man who has
spent the first fifty yeare of hie life away frotn etratei^lc
problems 1^0 to the Pentapjon, hsng ut> blp het, elt down at the
Secretary's deBk, and make the declelone which he Ic supp06€«l
to roake?
ReprefentatlTe Mahon exr>re?^ped a laclt of confidence In
the vTolnt Chiefs as an organization and as to the effectiveness
of their planning. He believee they are good men, but that they
have not been able to function very effectively.
There 1b unanimity of or»lnlon as to the Increasing
Importance of the federal budget and itp effect on r.llltary
Ptratepy. At least two nia,1or seffments of the problem are
apparent. Hov/ rouch defenr-e can we afford? How military
strategic planniag can be effectively correlated with the
bud fret by top-level civilians and military officers to provide
optimum security for our country.
BaF,lp For military Planning; And Budg;etlnp^
The President, National Security Council, Bureau of the
Budget, Oepartment of Defense are the major participants in the
military strategic planning/budget process.
The intricacies of the process plus the large number of
government officials interested and Involved in the procedures,
altogether contribute to make it a laost coasplioated and diffi-
cult process to comprehend. There are many so-called *'grey"
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ftreaCf In vhlch clear-cut decisione ere difficult to make. It
le also a problem to dettrmlne who chould make theoi.
The adequacy of the ourrent defense bvtdget for military
requlreaiente Ip deterKlnc5d by the judgment of top civilian
official!' In our government* *'Thic budget aseuree that
eesentlal neede are met." It le not readily apparent that
anyone reslly knows what theer eesentlal need© are or If the
bu(^p;et actually provldep for them.
Military officere can do a better job in correlating
military planning and the budget to apsipt civilian officials
in making I'-ltal defenee/budget decleions. It aiuet be reffiembered
that a bud(3:et reviewer' b judgicent as to the reaeonablenese of
requeeted funds can be no better than his si'^sP ©^ ^^® accoiu-
pliehjoente to be attained*
The paeeap-e of the Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958 strengthened the or?:ani%atlcn of the Joint Chiefs
of ^'taff by providing for more effective etrateglc planning
and centrsli^ed control of all forces. If the Joint Chiefs
deterri'ine over-all force requirements and correlate force levels/
functions with their estlnsated coet, needed background informa-
tion will be available for civilian officials reviewing and
ffjaking decisions affect Inac the iefense budget. Further, the
Joint ChiefB of Staff are In a position to take a horizontal
look at the forces the Indlvllual serviceB are actually provid-
ing and to deterinine their sufficiency to meet our miHtary
requirementB.
The Joint Chiefs should attesapt to suffiBsarlze force
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requirement© by major functions, Including a break-down by
services, various levels of capabilities and approximate costs
of weapons systems and forces as related to the functions.
The goal Is to provide Improved military capabilities and better
Information concerning where our defense dollars are spent and
why. In our existing defense budget process, there Is an
urgent need to realistically determine the effect of various
budget levels on the operational capabilities of our military
forces.
Military Operations Research
Operations Research Is the application of scientific
method to the study of operational problems in order to give
military commanders a quantitative basis for decision. Its func-
tions are to define the decision area, to narrow the scope and
to test It In terras of expected results. Operations Research is
merely an aid, not a device to provide the answer to military
problems. There is no one solution or even several specific
solutions. To achieve effective military capabilities, numerous
alternatives and widely different allocations of capabilities mus
be explored to determine a proper balance between conflicting con-'
slderations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must evaluate war plans and
relate vital problems of force structure and weapon systems. De-
tailed cost-effectiveness studies of military requirernents are
needed for budgetary considerations. Ey.istlng operation research
programs of the services should be coordinated and employed so
that individual and combined military capabilities and related
costs are brought into sharper focus at the Joint Chiefs of Staff
level. The merits of systematic analysis and of an electronic
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fact finder to aeelst in the decision malting process should be
worthy of serious conaldaratlon and practical application. As
stated by Or. Brodie, the n«>iF method does not throw out the
best of tne old, for it attempts to incorporate in orderly
fashion whatever ic ^ood in strong intuition, and the military
oofflBianders still consider and accept or reject its findings.
The Kiajorlty of military officers can no longer avoid
Involvement in the challenging subject of the defense bud«5et.
¥hether at th© i»ashlna;.ton level, at field activitiee or with
the operating forces, budget coneiderations are increacing in
Importance. The competition for limited fundE is becoraing
keener eve-vj day. Our future lailitary operating forces are
largely dependent upon today's budget declsione aade mainly
by civilian offidale. By kno^fing aa much as possible about
their financial considerations, you can help them malte militari-
ly sound budget decielone. It Is far easier for an officer
to acquire financial knowledge than it is for a budget reviewer
to beCO©© a asilitary operator.
There is no job that we do that \m could not do better,
if we epent more tlire thinking how we ciisht. .re all need to
know more, think inore, and understand better the thinking behind
the worde of the men with whom we do business.
Above all, military officer© isust develop conceptual
vision In fflilitary planning—-operationE-—ana budgets. The trend
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